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ALTERNATIVE FORMS Of JUDICIAL
REVIEW
Mark Tushnet*
The invention in the late twentieth century of what I call
weak-form systems of judicial review provides us with the chance to
see in a new light some traditional debates within U.S. constitutional
law and theory, which are predicated on the fact that the United States
has strong-form judicial review.1 Strong- and weak-form systems oper
ate on the level of constitutional design, in the sense that their charac
teristics are specified in constitutional documents or in deep-rooted
constitutional traditions. After sketching the differences between
strong- and weak-form systems, I turn to design features that operate
at the next lower level. Here legislatures or courts specify whether
their enactments or decisions will receive strong- or weak-form treat
ment. I examine examples of legislative allocations of issues to
strong- and weak-form review and identify some practical and
conceptual problems with such allocations. Then I examine judicial
allocations - of the courts' own decisions - to strong- or weak-form
categories. Here I consider Thayerian judicial review and what
Professor Dan Coenen has called semisubstantive doctrines as exam
ples of judicial choices to give their decisions weak-form effects. 2 My
conclusion is that these allocation strategies reproduce within
strong- and weak-form systems the issues that arise on the level of
constitutional design. Weak-form systems and allocation strategies

* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law
Center. B.A. 1967, Harvard; J.D. 1971, M.A. (History) 1971, Yale. - Ed. This Essay is one
of a series on modern forms of judicial review. Its specific focus arose from comments by
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong on a draft of one of those essays, Forms of Judicial Review as
Expressions of Constitutional Patriotism, 22 LAW & P HIL. 353 (2003), and I am indebted to
Professor Sinnott-Armstrong for turning my thought in this direction. I also profited from
comments at a presentation at Seattle University Law School and by Barry Friedman, Jeff
Goldsworthy, and Lorraine Weinrib.

1. For definitions of strong- and weak-form judicial review, see Section I.A infra. As the
ensuing discussion indicates, the assertion that weak-form systems were invented in the late
twentieth century may be overstated. Perhaps a more accurate statement would be that judi
cial review was invented in a weak form, but became transformed over two centuries to the
point where weak-form systems had to be reinvented, with novel design features, in the late
twentieth century.
2. Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with
Second-Look Rules of lnterbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575 (2001)
[hereinafter Coenen, Constitution of Collaboration]; Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court,
Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281
(2002) [hereinafter Coenen, The Rehnquist Court].
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may seem to alleviate some difficulties associated with strong-form
systems in constitutional democracies. My analysis suggests that those
difficulties may persist even when alternatives to strong-form judicial
review are adopted.
I.

STRONG- AND WEAK-FORM JUDICIAL REVIEW - SOME
DISTINCTIONS

A.

The Basic Distinction

For perhaps a century the nature of judicial review in the United
States was uncertain. Although Marbury v. Madison confirmed that
the U.S. Supreme Court had the power to declare unconstitutional a
statute enacted by Congress, the scope of the Marbury power, and its
relation to the Constitution-interpreting roles of the other branches,
remained contested for decades. Marbury can be taken to establish a
system of what some scholars call a departmentalist system of judicial
review.
Departmentalism comes in two variants. In the first, each
department has sole responsibility for determining the constitutional
ity of actions by other departments affecting its own operation. 3
Marbury is a departmentalist decision in this sense because the Court
determined
that
Congress
had
improperly
rearranged
the
Constitution's allocation of power within the judiciary.4 In the second
variant of departmentalism, each branch has a constitutional right or perhaps even a duty - to act on its own best interpretation of the
Constitution, no matter what the other branches have said.5 Marbury
is departmentalist in this sense too, because the Court rejected a rea
sonable interpretation of the Constitution, adopted by Congress and
the president in enacting the Judiciary Act provision invalidated there,
in favor of its own interpretation. 6

3. The basic studies of departmentalism are ROBERT L. CLINTON, MARBURY v.
MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989), and SHANNON c. STIMSON, T HE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN J URISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN
MARSHALL (1990).
4. Most of the precedents for judicial review were departmentalist in this sense, involv
ing, typically, statutes affecting the role of juries.
5. For an overview of this position, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The ."vlost Dangerous
Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994).
6. In this version of departmentalism, the views of the other branches play two roles.
First, those views are entitled to respectful consideration, as data bearing on each
department's own interpretation, but they are not conclusive. Second, the fact that one
department disagrees with another has implications for the prudential judgment about what
ought to be done given the disagreement. Sometimes the costs to the constitutional system
of a department insisting on its own interpretation, in terms of stability and the like, may be
so large as to justify the department in refusing to act on its own judgment while insisting on
its power to do so.
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Departmentalism in its first variant was a reasonable description of
constitutional practice for much of the nineteenth century. Vigorous
constitutional debates about the tariff, the scope of Congress's power
to subsidize "internal improvements" such as roads that would link
one part of the nation to another, and - of course - slavery took
place in Congress and in presidential campaigns.7 For example,
Andrew Jackson vetoed the act rechartering the Bank of the United
States, partly because he thought that, the Supreme Court
notwithstanding, Congress lacked the power to charter a bank. The
veto message stated: "The opinion of the judges has no more authority
over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and
on that point the President is independent of both."8
At some point this departmentalist practice weakened substan
tially.9 The people of the United States, acting through our institu
tions, had to define the contours of our system of judicial review
because the Constitution says nothing about the institution. Judicial
review changed from the means by which the courts expressed their
view of the Constitution's meaning, in a system where other institu
tions expressed their own independent views, to a mechanism for
lodging responsibility for constitutional interpretation in a single insti
tution, the judiciary.10 So, for example, in 1935 Franklin Delano
Roosevelt advised a member of Congress to put aside his constitu
tional doubts and "leav[e] to the courts, in an orderly fashion, the
ultimate question of constitutionality."1 1 Cooper v. Aaron asserted that
the Court's interpretations bind all political actors.1 2 And, though an
assertion by the Court of its own power cannot make it so, Cooper has

7. For some examples, see

H. JEFFERSON POWELL,

A

COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS:

THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND POLITICS (2002); KEITH WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING

(1999); and Mark Graber, Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions:
Tocqueville's Thesis Revisited, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association (2000) (on file with author).
8. 2
1900).

MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS

576, 581-82 (James Richardson ed.,

9. I am unaware of a definitive history identifying with any precision the period when
departmentalism substantially disappeared. The possibilities range, I think, from the late
nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth.
10. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), clearly assumes that the U.S. system is
strong-form and, as I will argue, Thayerian j udicial review does so as well. In light of the lat
ter point, I suppose we can say that strong-form review existed - as a target for Thayer's
analysis, at least - by the 1890s.
11. KATHLEEN A. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22 (14th
ed. 2001). Roosevelt continued with words that can be given a slightly more departmentalist
reading: "A decision by the Supreme Court relative to this measure would be helpful as indi
cating {the] constitutional limits within which this Government must operate." Id. (emphasis
added). " Helpful as indicating" is more departmentalist than, for example, "would indicate"
would have been.
12. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).

2784

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101 :2781

been taken to be at most a slightly overstated formulation of the
nondepartmentalism that characterizes contemporary judicial review
in the United States.'3
Strong-form judicial review rejects both forms of departmentalism.
In strong-form judicial review, the courts have general authority to
determine what the Constitution means.14 And, more important for
present purposes, the courts' constitutional interpretations are
authoritative and binding on the other branches, at least in the short to
medium run. 1 5
The strong-form aspect of the U.S. system became the model for
the constitutional courts adopted by other nations after World War II,
even as system-designers rejected other aspects of the U.S. system.1 6
For example, the German Constitutional Court, perhaps the world's
leading constitutional court after the U.S. Supreme Court, is a
strong-form court.17 And, for many years, it seemed that judicial
review meant strong-form review, a fact that provided an argument
against the institution for those concerned about giving a substantial
policymaking role to (mere) judges.18
The possibilities for institutional design changed, however, when
the drafters of Canada's Charter of Rights invented weak-form judi-

13. Citing additional Supreme Court cases such as Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428 (2000), and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), would not support this asser
tion, but perhaps citing the controversy over Attorney General Edwin Meese's assertion in a
1987 speech of a moderate departmentalist view will. For citations, see SULLIVAN &
GUNTHER, supra note 1 1 , at 25-26.
14. Whatever limits there are on that authority, such as those imposed by the political
question doctrine or interpretive approaches counseling deference to the policy judgments
of the other branches, originate from the courts themselves. For a discussion of the
difference between deferential review and Thayerian review, see infra text accompanying
notes 64-65.
15. Judicial interpretations are not absolutely binding, first, because they can be
overturned by a constitutional amendment, which in principle could occur quite rapidly (as
occurred with the Eleventh Amendment), and second, because they can be rejected as new
justices are appointed to the Court and constitutional doctrine changes.
16. For example, system-designers seem to have believed that judicial independence
could be secured without giving the judges life tenure, and that doing so promoted other im
portant constitutional values. Some system-designers also apparently believed that systems
of judicial review should incorporate as expressly as possible the judgment that constitu
tional review was a task that combined legal and political dimensions.
17. Although German legal theorists took some time to reconcile the practice of
strong-form review with their jurisprudential assumptions. For brief discussions, see DAYID
P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 169 n.346
(1994), and DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 54 (2d ed. 1997).
18. Often this concern is phrased as one about the diminution of a people's
self-governing capacity when courts exercise strong-form review. Understood in that way,
the concern is alleviated, if not eliminated, when the people knowingly acquiesce in strong
form review. For a discussion. see Mark Tushnet, Forms of Judicial Review as Expressions of
Constitutional Patriotism 22 LAW & PHIL. 353 (2003).
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cial review in 1981. 19 The Charter's now-famous Section 33 allows the
legislature to determine that a statute would go into effect
notwithstanding its possible conflict with specified Charter provisions.
One point of the notwithstanding clause was to give the Canadian
Supreme Court a role in constitutional interpretation without making
that Court's judgments completely authoritative in the short run. A
legislature that disagreed with the court's interpretation could reenact
the legislation found invalid, protecting against a subsequent challenge
by invoking Section 33.20
Section 33 appears to have encouraged other system-designers to
think creatively about the forms of judicial review. For present
purposes I need mention only two, the New Zealand Bill of Rights and
the British Human Rights Act of 1998. The former directs the courts
to interpret all legislation so as to make the legislation compatible with
the Bill of Rights, but gives the courts no power to refrain from
enforcing statutes that, fairly read, are inconsistent with the Bill of
Rights. 21 The latter couples the interpretive directive with a judicial
power to declare a statute incompatible with guaranteed rights and an
ensuing ministerial power to modify the statute rapidly, to bring it into
compliance with those rights. 22

19. For a discussion of the circumstances under which the invention occurred, see
(3d ed. 1992).

PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA

20. The story did not develop quite as the inventors imagined. For complex reasons one of which may have been the infelicity of drafting § 33 to refer to action notwithstanding
the Charter's provisions rather than action notwithstanding a j udicial interpretation of those
provisions -§ 33 has, I believe, turned out to be something of a nonprovision in Canadian
constitutional law. The fact that § 33 can be used prior to a judicial interpretation, thereby
protecting against even an initial j udicial interpretation, probably makes sense, but both in
theory and in practice such prospective uses create problems. The terms of a provision
authorizing prospective uses would have to be quite complex to capture the idea that a pro
spective use was guarding against a Supreme Court misinterpretation of the Charter. The
actual prospective uses, by Quebec as part of its struggle for independence and by Alberta to
protect against an anticipated Supreme Court holding that laws barring gays from marrying
violate equality norms, have not given the prospective use of§ 33 a good name in Canadian
constitutional culture. For a discussion, see Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review
and the Persistence of Rights- and Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813
( 2003) [hereinafter Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review].
My view of§ 33, I should note, while not idiosyncratic, is one that is quite controversial
among Canadian constitutionalists (when asserted by Canadian scholars who have studied
the system more than I have). Those who assert that§ 33 has operated well, and as intended,
note that it was not designed with frequent use in mind, and that its existence has had an ef
fect on structuring statutory design, so that rare recourse to§ 33 does not show that the pro
vision has been ineffective.
21. The Canadian Charter of Rights displaced an earlier Canadian Bill of Rights, which
provided the model for the New Zealand Bill of Rights.
22. See Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49
AM. J. COMP. L. 707 (2001), for a discussion of these forms of judicial review. I prefer the
label weak-form to "Commonwealth model," because I do not think that there is any intrin
sic connection between the form of judicial review and the fact that the best examples come
from the Commonwealth. Weak-form systems are a natural response to a desire to impose
j udicially enforceable limits on legislative action in nations where the tradition of parliamen-
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The mark of weak-form review is not that the scope of judicial
review is narrow. Courts in weak-form systems have the power to
evaluate all legislation to determine whether it is consistent with all of
the constitution's provisions without exception. Rather, the mark of
weak-form review is that ordinary legislative majorities can displace
judicial interpretations of the constitution in the relatively short run. 23
Weak-form review responds to the concern that strong-form review
allows courts with an attenuated democratic pedigree to displace deci
sions taken by bodies with stronger democratic pedigrees. Yet, weak
form systems raise their own concerns - primarily, that weak-form
review, to use Marbury's terms, converts the Constitution into an "or
dinary legislative act[] ... alterable when the legislature shall please to
alter it. " 24
Strong-form and weak-form judicial review are ways of structuring
judicial review. Scholars of constitutional structure have given insuffi
cient attention, I believe, to the question of who selects the form of
review. The remainder of this Article addresses that question.
B..

The Level of Institutional Choice

As presented so far, the choice between strong- and weak-form
judicial review seems to occur at the most fundamental level of institu
tional design. Sometimes the choice is made by the constitution's
designers and is memorialized in the constitution; sometimes �
nation's legal culture gradually accepts the proposition that judicial
review takes a strong or a weak form.25 But, once we see that there is
more than one form of judicial review, we can consider whether
strong- and weak-forms can be created at the next level of institutional
operation - not by the constitution's designers themselves, but by the
legislators and judges who implement the constitution.26 The idea here

tary sovereignty is strong and has continuing support among politically relevant actors.
Commonwealth nations may provide the best examples of such governments, but they are
not the only ones.
23. Weak-form review thus rejects the first variant of departmentalism while embracing
the second.
24. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). This statemen.t is inaccurate
with respect to weak-form systems that place some procedural impediments in the way of
easy legislative response, but each such impediment moves the purportedly weak-form sys
tem some way down the line toward strong-form systems.
25. The United States exemplifies the first of these gradualist paths. Perhaps Sweden
exemplifies the second. The Swedish Constitution of 1915 created a constitutional court with
the power of judicial review, but that court did not find primary legislation unconstitutional
for more than seven decades. A culture of weak-form review may be one explanation, but so
may be the language of the Swedish Constitution, which enjoins the court to "set aside" a
statute "only if the fault is manifest." Swed. Const., Ch. 11, art. 14, available at
http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/swOOOOO_.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2003).
26. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong characterized these forms of judicial review as intermedi
ate between strong- and weak-form. As indicated in the text, I believe it is better to concep-
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is that legislators and judges can allocate particular issues or statutes
to strong- or weak-form judicial review, while leaving other issues to a
default form of review.27
There are, however, asymmetries in the choices available in
strong- and weak-form systems. Legislators in a system of weak-form
review on the constitutional level can require courts to exercise
strong-form review, thereby relinquishing their own power to revisit
the issues they remit to the courts.28 But, the courts in a weak-form
system cannot themselves choose to exercise strong-form review.29
And, in parallel fashion, courts where the default position established
by the constitution is strong-form review can decide for themselves to
allow legislatures to "override" the courts' decisions on some matters,
by issuing decisions that, through a variety of doctrinal devices, are by
their own terms merely provisional.30 But, legislatures in a strong-form
system cannot require that courts make their decisions on some
questions readily revisable.
These asymmetries complicate the exposition of designs that allow
for choice between strong- and weak-form review at the legislative
and judicial levels. Although my primary concern is with constitutional
design in general, my primary strategy for addressing this difficulty is
to draw examples from periods when it remained unsettled whether
the U.S. system was strong- or weak-form.31 In doing so, I do not mean

tualize them as dealing with the creation of judicial review at a different level than the
constitution. For me, an intermediate form of review would be one that adopted something
like a moderately strong form of departmentalism coupled with a moderately strong form of
judicial exclusivity. I do not know how such a system could be designed, and, in general, I am
skeptical of the stability of anything other than truly strong-form systems or truly weak-form
ones. For a discussion of the possible instability of Canada's purportedly weak-form system,
see Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review, supra note 20.
27. Or, at least in theory, to a default of no review at all. In the modern world, however,
designers of constitutional systems have universally chosen to insert judicial review into their
designs.
28. Subject to an important qualification discussed in Part II of this Essay.
29. Except, of course, as a move in a long-term process through which weak-form re
view is converted into strong-form review.
30. A note on Dormant Commerce Clause review in the United States is appropriate
here. The Supreme Court has held that its determinations that state regulations "unconstitu
tionally" interfere with interstate commerce can be revised by Congress, through statutes
that give states permission to enact the laws the Court invalidated. See, e.g., In re Rahrer, 140
U.S. 545 (1891). For a discussion, see William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate
Unconstitlllional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387
(1983). One can view this doctrine as a choice by a strong-form Court to engage in
weak-form review. Alternatively, one can view it as a doctrine that does not involve judicial
review at all, seeing the courts as agencies exercising a power Congress delegated to them
that is subject to ordinary congressional review and oversight.
31. Or, at least, I invite readers to consider the examples on the assumption that the
choice remained open at the constitutional level. (Of course I also provide examples from
situations where the asymmetries do not matter.)
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to suggest that all the possibilities I discuss are available now that the
U.S. system has become a strong-form one.
II.

ALLOCATION BY THE LEGISLATURE

Mark Graber's analysis of Dred Scott32 and the abortion cases33
illustrates the strategy of legislative allocation.34 According to Graber,
legislative majorities in those instances invited the courts to resolve a
constitutional controversy. In the 1850s, the Northern and Southern
wings of the congressional Democratic Party - together, a working
majority in Congress - found it impossible to resolve their differences
on the issue of whether Congress had the power to ban or regulate
slavery in the territories. The party's leaders solved their problem by
inviting the Supreme Court to decide the question, supporting the

Dred Scott litigation in the lower courts and signaling the justices that
the party leaders would welcome the Court's intervention. They would
then defer to the Court, invoking the idea of strong-form review to
justify their refusal to do anything other than go along with the Court.
Graber also suggests that, less consciously, deferring the abortion
issue to the courts solved problems within both the Republican and
Democratic party coalitions.35 Republicans were divided between an
older, northeastern wing and an emerging southern and western wing
that was more conservative on social issues than the Rockefeller
Republicans of the northeast. Democrats were divided between a
Catholic working-class constituency and limousine liberals. The abor- ,
tion issue divided both party coalitions. Sending the issue to the courts
allowed party leaders to avoid taking a position on legislation in a
setting where taking any position would be politically damaging. And,
notably, once the courts acted in a legal culture accepting strong-form
review, the internal divisions became much less pressing: In each
party, critics of the Court could have their say without forcing their
coalition partners to do anything, because in a strong-form system
there was nothing that could be done in the short run to respond to
the Court.
Neil Devins has identified another contemporary version of this
phenomenon. Devins notes the numerous statutory provisions
providing for rapid Supreme Court review of constitutionally conten-

32. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the
Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993).
35. I emphasize that, while there is evidence that party leaders consciously sought
Supreme Court resolution of the slavery issue, there is no sue!) evidence - nor does Graber
claim there is - that party leaders were similarly conscious about deferring the abortion
issue to the courts.
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tious legislation such as the Line Item Veto Act and campaign finance
reform.36 In some formal sense perhaps, Congress takes the position
that its enactments conform to the Constitution. But, the fast-track
judicial review provisions also indicate uncertainty within Congress
(that is, by enough members of Congress to make inclusion of a fast
track review provision a politically sensible thing to do) about the cor
rectness of its position. And, finally, these provisions indicate
Congress's willingness to accept the Court as the final arbiter of the
constitutional questions. It would be churlish indeed for Congress,
having invited the Supreme Court to decide the constitutional ques
tion, to assert in departmentalist terms that the Court's views are
interesting and relevant but not binding.
Yet, this sort of statutory charge to the Court to exercise
strong-form review raises its own questions. Of course, the very
Congress that invited the Court to decide is unlikely to rise up in
outrage at what the Court does. But, the Dred Scott and abortion
examples suggest that a perspective that has a slightly longer time ho
rizon might give a different answer to the question of whether legisla
tors will accept the Court's decisions and, thus, whether the Court
actually can exercise strong-form review. The Dred Scott decision
rapidly became a central issue of political contention, as the new
Republican party exploited the decision to exacerbate tensions within
the constituencies supporting the Democratic party. Dred Scott was
decided in 1857. Less than a year later, the decision was a central fea
ture in Abraham Lincoln's campaign against Stephen A. Douglas for a
Senate seat to represent Illinois in Congress, a campaign that pushed
Lincoln into the national spotlight. The national majority that elected
Lincoln in 1860 repudiated Dred Scott politically.37 The Dred Scott
story shows that a legislative allocation of a constitutional question to
a nominally strong-form system may not achieve the intended goal.38
One can generalize a bit from the Dred Scott story. Legislative
allocations to strong-form review can succeed as long as legislators and, importantly, those elected to succeed the initial enactors accept, not just the Supreme Court's decision, but also the initial deci36. Neil Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's
Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435 (2001).
37. And, formally, Dred Scott was repudiated by the first sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment, adopted after the Civil War in 1868. See U.S. CON ST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.").
38. The abortion story is somewhat more complicated, involving as it does the quite
gradual erosion of the position of northeastern Republicans within that party, coupled with
the nomination and confirmation of federal judges hostile to the Supreme Court's abortion
decisions. While the Dred Scott story indicates how a legislative allocation to a strong-form
system may fail, the abortion story suggests that the legislative allocation can succeed
because strong-form systems are defined by the power of courts to make their decisions stick
in the medium to long run, as the abortion decisions have.
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sion to defer the issue to the courts. The issue purportedly taken off
the table by the first legislature will reappear if members of the second
legislature want it to.39
The reason arises from the asymmetry discussed earlier. A legisla
ture can allocate issues to strong-form review only if the system is
weak-form on the constitutional level. I use a stylized version of the
events surrounding Ex parte McCardle to illustrate the point.40 After
the Civil War, Congress engaged in a program of military occupation
of the formerly rebellious states. The program's constitutionality was
open to serious question. Congress enacted a statute expanding the
scope of habeas corpus as part of the Reconstruction effort. One
incidental consequence of that statute, whose implications were
probably not foreseen, was an expansion of the scope of the Supreme
Court's authority to review lower court decisions in habeas corpus
cases. We can describe this as Congress inviting the Supreme Court to
determine the Reconstruction program's constitutionality. An oppo
nent of Congress's Reconstruction program took up the invitation and
brought a habeas corpus petition to the Supreme Court using the new
statute's procedures. Fearful that the Supreme Court might strike
down the Reconstruction program, Congress then repealed the provi
sion expanding Supreme Court review. Having put the constitutional
question on the Court's agenda, in a manner akin to the one Graber
describes, Congress then took it off the agenda.

Ex parte McCardle asked whether Congress could actually do that.
McCardle was whether one Congress could

That is, the issue in

foreclose another Congress from withdrawing the invitation to the
Court to decide the constitutional question. The Supreme Court said
no; the initial decision by Congress could not bar a later one from
taking jurisdiction away from the Court. Interpreting the
Constitution's provisions dealing with Congress's power to regulate
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, the Court held that Congress's
power was plenary, and that it was "not at liberty to inquire into the
motives of the legislature."41 McCardle, seen in the light cast by my
argument, is a case in which the legislature in a system with weak-form
judicial review invited the Supreme Court to exercise strong-form
review, and then revoked the invitation, reinstituting the default
system.
The McCardle Court went along with Congress's decision. It might
(in theory at least) have refused to do so. Such a decision would have
been an assertion that power - here, the power to exercise
39. In effect, the later legislature says to the earlier one, "You're no longer around and
can't do anything to bind us to the decision you made."
40. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). Stylization helps because the events as they actually
unfolded are not precisely what is needed to make the point discussed in the text.
41. Id. at 514.

·
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strong-form review - once delegated cannot be retrieved: The earlier
legislature's decision does bind the later one by means of judicial
enforcement of the earlier one's choice. But, does this .make concep
tual sense? After all, there is a long standing maxim of constitutional
and statutory law, lex posterior derogat legi priori, meaning that "later
law overrules earlier law." Why should not this maxim apply to the
second legislature's revocation of the first legislature's allocation of an
issue to strong-form review?
We can see why it is indeed applicable by considering why the
maxim does not apply when a statute is challenged as inconsistent with
an earlier adopted constitution. In some sense, all constitutions
involve an irretrievable delegation of power.42 The people create a
constitution that imposes restrictions on the people later on, as they
act through their elected representatives. So, if constitutionalism is a
form of irretrievable delegation, why could not the legislative authori
zation of strong-form review in a system whose constitution specifies
weak-form review be similarly irretrievable?
European constitutional theory provides the answer.43 That theory
distinguishes between the people acting in their capacity to create a
constitution, and the people acting within the framework of the consti
tution they have created. It describes the former as the pouvoir
constituant - the constituting power - and the latter as the pouvoir
constituee - the constituted power. The pouvoir constituee is subordi
nate to the pouvoir constituant, so, while the constituting power can do
whatever it wants, constituted powers may not. The real bite of the
distinction comes in thinking through its institutional implications.
European constitutional theorists tend to insist that different institu
tions must exercise the two powers. A constitutional convention can
constitute power, but a legislature cannot. More generally, according
to these theorists, action on the level of the pouvoir constituant can
bind actors on the subordinate level, but, they say, an actor cannot
bind future actors on the same level: A new constitutional convention
can completely displace what a prior constitutional convention did,
and a later legislature can completely repudiate what a prior one did.44
Seen in this light, and putting the specifics of the U.S. Constitution
aside, the stylized version of Mccardle shows why a legislative strategy
of allocating issues to strong-form review in a system of weak-form
review on the level of constitutional design may be unstable. Political

42. As before, irretrievable must be understood here to mean "irretrievable without
going through some extraordinary procedures."
43. For an introduction to this aspect of European constitutional theory, see Andrew
Arato, Forms of Constitution and Making Theories of Democracy, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 191
(1995).

44. Unless, of course, the constitution itself limits what later legislatures can do, for
example through ex post facto clauses.
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circumstances arising in the short run might lead to new legislation
revoking the allocation. And, because the distinction between weak
and strong-form review depends entirely on whether judicial decisions
can be displaced by political ones in the short run or only in the long
run, this means that the strategy of legislative allocation is not, in prin
ciple, distinct from weak-form judicial review created at the constitu
tional level.
III. ALLOCATION BY THE COURTS
A court in a strong-form system may decline to exercise the power
it has, not simply by exercising whatever discretion it may have to
select cases or by invoking justiciability doctrines of its own making,45
but also by casting its decisions in expressly provisional terms or by
upholding legislation after applying a standard of review generous to
the legislature. In the first mode, the court may hold that the action at
issue might be permissible if taken by one body, such as the executive,
but is not permissible when taken by another. Or, it may hold that the
legislature has the power to accomplish its apparent goals, but only in
a statute that states those goals more clearly than the one before the
court. In the second mode, the court may find the legislation in some
tension with constitutional norms, but not so obviously unconstitu
tional as to justify the court's displacing the legislature's choice.
Both modes of decision may be seen as choices by the courts to
exercise weak-form review. Yet, one can question the efficacy of such
choices. Exercises of provisional review may degenerate into - or
may be disguises for - strong-form review, in situations where the
cost to the legislature of revisiting the issue is greater than the benefit
of doing so. This is normatively troubling when there is some social
gain from the initial legislation. The theory of provisional review is
that the legislature can do better for the society by a more carefully
drafted statute, for example. But, if no alternative statute could be en
acted for practical political reasons, society loses the benefit of the
badly drafted statute, without the court taking responsibility for lim
iting society's choices in the name of the constitution, as it does when
it openly exercises strong-form review.
The difficulty with deferential review is subtler. The kind of
deferential review with which I am concerned occurs when the court
acknowledges that its understanding of the constitution leads it to
conclude that the statute is inconsistent with constitutional norms, but
defers to the legislature's understanding, which it treats as reasonable'
albeit erroneous. The question about this kind of deferential review is:

45. The focus of Alexander Bickel's discussion in T HE LEAST DANGEROU S BRANCH:
T HE SUPREME COURT AT T HE BAR OF POLIT ICS (1962).
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What does it accomplish in a system committed to strong-form
review?
A.

Judicial Choices to Make Review Provisional

Courts with the power to make conclusive decisions need not exer
cise that power, though they may have a duty to decide in favor of one
or the other litigant. They may exercise provisional rather than
conclusive review - suspending the effect of a statute pending its re
consideration by the legislature, while holding out the promise that the
legislation, or something quite like it, will be allowed to go into effect
the next time around. Dan Coenen has recently compiled a catalogue
of devices for provisional review, and carefully analyzed each.46 Rather
than repeat his survey in detail, I provide a few examples as the basis
for a discussion of two points: the extent to which provisional review is
truly provisional, and the extent to which the devices of provisional
review can be used by courts in allocating issues to weak-form review.
Justice Hans Linde and the Supreme Court introduced the idea of
provisional review to modern U.S. constitutional law in 1976. Justice
Linde's article Due Process of Lawmaking argued that the way in
which laws were enacted and by whom should affect the courts' later
assessment of their constitutionality, independent of the statutes'
substance.47 Using this rationale, in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a regulation adopted by the Civil
Service Commission that barred resident aliens from civil service
positions.48 The Court agreed that such a ban might serve valuable
foreign-policy goals, but concluded that the Civil Service Commission
lacked the expertise - and the power - to promote U.S. foreign pol
icy in this way. Professor Coenen describes Hampton as a case holding
that the Constitution prescribes who must make particular decisions
without limiting the substance of those decisions once made by the
proper body.49 It exemplifies weak-form judicial review as well,
because no special procedures other than ones within the control of an
ordinary legislature need be followed - no supermajorities, no
extended consideration, nothing beyond a process that could have
been used in enacting the statute in the first place.
Professor Coenen elaborates a large number of similar rules, which
he describes as "how" rules - ones that tell legislatures how to go
about accomplishing the goals they seek in a constitutionally permissi-

46. Coenen, Constitution of Collaboration, supra note 2; Coenen, The Rehnquist Court,
supra note 2.

47. 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976).
48. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
49. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, supra note 2, at 1370-74 (describing other "who" de
cisions as well).
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ble way. The most obvious examples are clear-statement rules, which
in terms say explicitly that the Constitution does not preclude the
legislature from a particular goal but does require that the legislature
specify with some care exactly what it proposes to do.50 Professor
Coenen points out that rules sometimes criticized as exalting form
over substance have the same "how" structure.51 He uses the example
of the Court's Dormant Commerce Clause cases. There the Court has
expressly said that discriminatory taxes can have the same adverse
effects on interstate commerce that discriminatory subsidies do, but
that discriminatory subsidies are permissible and discriminatory taxes
prohibited. 52
In all of these areas, and many others, the Supreme Court says, in
effect:

You can do what you seem to want to do, but you haven't gone about it
in the right way. If you really care about this, go back and try again. If
you follow our directions about who has to make the decision, and how it
must be expressed, we'll uphold it against a renewed challenge.
So, for example, after

Hampton the president repromulgated the ban

on aliens in the civil service, and the courts upheld the renewed ban
because the president was the right person to make foreign"policy
decisions.53 Notably, the repromulgation occurred within a very short
period after the Supreme Court's initial decision, thus demonstrating
in concrete terms how the case exemplifies weak-form judicial review.
Yet, one can raise some questions about whether these devices are
generally versions of weak-form review or rather disguised forms of
strong-form review. The concern is that the devices hold out the hope
of reenactment followed by unsuccessful constitutional challenge,
but may be used in circumstances where practical politics make
reenactment extremely unlikely.
The tax-subsidy cases provide a useful starting point. The theory
behind the cases is that express subsidies will attract more political
attention within the enacting state, because they involve appropria
tions, and therefore will be more difficult to enact than discriminatory
taxes will be. That is to say, though, that the courts know that taxes
and subsidies are economically equivalent devices but are politically
different. Striking down a discriminatory tax while saying that a

50. Vagueness cases are similar, in that they involve judicial determinations, not that a
legislature cannot accomplish a particular goal, but that the statute the legislature has
adopted does not identify clearly enough that it aimed only at that goal rather than at other
ends fairly encompassed by the statute's language as well.
51. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, supra note 2, at 1329-35.
52. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 ( 1994); see also Coenen, The
Rehnquist Court, supra note 2, at 1329 (citing cases and commentary).

53. Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom.,
Lum v. Campbell, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
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discriminatory subsidy if enacted will be upheld is, in practical political
terms, an exercise of strong-form review because the courts know or believe, with good reason - that no discriminatory subsidy will in
fact be adopted.
The point about the politics of enacting judicially acceptable
alternatives can be generalized. The best defense of provisional review
is that it allows the courts to bring to the legislature's attention consti
tutional values that it may have overlooked or given less value than
the courts think it should have. After a provisional invalidation, the
legislature can take the overlooked value into account or place a new
weight on the value and enact a new, somewhat modified statute, or
decide that, all in all, it had placed the correct weight on the value in
its initial enactment. Provisional review means that the courts should
uphold the new, modified statute or the old reenacted one. The diffi
culty with this defense of provisional review is that it overestimates the
ease with which a legislature can revisit its earlier decisions.54
Enacted statutes embody a set of political choices and compro
mises among the members voting for the statutes. Change a statute's
terms by requiring greater precision or a clearer statement, and you
change the array of political forces. Someone who might support a
statute that only indirectly imposes costs on states, for example, might
be unwilling to support a statute that directly did so. Requiring a clear
statement in such a situation means, in practical effect, barring
Congress from imposing the costs at all. Even more generally, "who"
and "how" requirements increase the cost of legislating (beyond the
cost that exists in the absence of such requirements). Increase the cost,
and you diminish the supply. The mechanism is simple: Legislators
have a lot of things to do, and the more costly you make doing one of
them, the more readily they switch to doing something else.55
Seemingly provisional review, then, may not be provisional in
practice.56 In addition, and perhaps more important in the present con
text, it is not clear that forms of provisional review provide a strategy
that courts can use to allocate some issues to strong-form review and
others to weak-form review. In introducing his analysis, Professor
Coenen asserts that "the Court confines its use of semisubstantive
rulings to cases in which the substantive values at stake are (in the
Court's view) distinctively deserving of judicial protection."57 As the
54. The quick readoption of the regulation at issue in Hampton shows that the difficul
ties I have identified are not insurmountable. Notably, though, readopting the regulation
required only action by the president, not new legislation. I note that even presidential ac
tion may face impediments as proposals are processed through the executive bureaucracy.
55.

For a brief elaboration of this point, see Mark Tushnet, Judicial Activism or

Restraint in a Section 33 World, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 89 (2003).

56. For a general discussion, see Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review, supra note 20,
at§ IV.
57. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, supra note 2, at 1283.
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examples accumulate, though, that assertion seems increasingly ques
tionable. Professor Coenen shows that the Court uses these devices in
virtually every area of constitutional law. His later observation, that
the Court's use of the doctrines is "widespread," seems more
accurate.58 Professor Coenen connects his argument to Professor Cass
Sunstein's defense of judicial minimalism, which has been taken as an
account of what the courts should do across-the-board.59 To the extent
that Professor Coenen's account describes contemporary U.S. prac
tice, the Court does not appear to be using the devices as part of an·
allocation strategy.
And, perhaps, for good reason. Recall Professor Coenen's formu
lation, that the Court uses provisional review when "the substantive
values" are "distinctively deserving of judicial protection."60 But, of
course, those substantive values are values embodied in the
Constitution. An allocation strategy predicated on Professor Coenen's
formulation would lead the courts to sort values embodied in the
Constitution into two boxes, one containing those "distinctively
deserving" judicial protection, and the other, it would seem, contain
ing those deserving judicial protection (given the existence of judicial
review at all), but not distinctively so.61 Yet, the basis upon which
constitutional values can be sorted is obscure, or at least is in some
tension with the underlying theory of strong-form judicial review,
which calls upon the courts to enforce the constitution as a whole.62
The devices Professor Coenen analyzes could form the basis for a
strategy whereby the courts allocate some issues to weak-form review

58. Id. at 1396.
59. Id. at 1397-98. Sunstein's own presentation is more qualified. He argues that maxi
malist decisions are appropriate when a number of conditions are met. Still, I believe
Coenen is correct in using Sunstein's work in support of a general approach to constitutional
adjudication, because that is how it has been assimilated into contemporary scholarship.
60. Id. at 1283.
61. I simply note that, to the extent that we might think that some constitutional values
are simply more important than others (along the lines of thinking that the First
Amendment, for example, is more important than the Statement and Accounts Clause), we
might think that weak-form or provisional review should be used for the less important
values, and strong-form review for the more important ones. Alternatively, we might think
that public attention will focus less on statutes implicating the less important values, thereby
allowing Congress to reenact statutes provisionally invalidated without additional delibera
tion, with the implication that strong-form review should be used in connection with the less
important values, and provisional review in connection with the more important ones. What
is at stake in this note are the details of an allocation system, and I am more concerned with
the very possibility of devising such a system than with its details.
62. Subject only to a minor exclusion of provisions that present political questions, an
exclusion that is itself difficult to justify within a theory of strong-form j udicial review. For
discussions, see Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597
(1976), and Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The
Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203
(2002).
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and others to strong-form review. Yet, the practice he examines does
not provide much assurance that such a strategy can sensibly be
devised.
B.

Thayerian or Tutelary Review

James Bradley Thayer's classic article on constitutional law
defended the view that the Supreme Court should invalidate legisla
tion only when the legislation was manifestly inconsistent with the
Constitution.63 It is important to stress that Thayerian review is predi
cated on the assumption that the legislature has indeed made a consti
tutional error (in the court's eyes), in enacting a statute from whose
enactment we infer that the legislature believed the statute to be
constitutional. But, according to Thayer, the court should not set aside
the legislature's erroneous judgment about what the constitution
permits unless that judgment was quite seriously wrong.
True Thayerian review should be distinguished from the far more
prevalent modern version of deferential review in, as the Supreme
Court has put it, cases involving social and economic rights.64 In
upholding a Maryland statute dealing with public assistance to the
poor and distinguishing between such cases and those involving
fundamental rights, the Court expressed its view that, by invoking a
deferential standard of review, "We do not decide today that the
Maryland regulation is wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and
economic objectives that Maryland might ideally espouse, or that a
more just and humane system could not be devised."65 Similarly, in
sounding a "cautionary" note about the Court's decision upholding
Texas's system of financing education primarily through the property
tax, the Court asserted, "We hardly need add that this Court's action
today is not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the
status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may
well have relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax."66
These are claims that the statutes in question may be unwise, rather
than claims that the statutes are unconstitutional yet nonetheless will
be accepted by the Court.

63. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. R EV. 129 (1893). Thayer's formulation was, "It [the court]
can only disregard the Act when those who have the right to make laws have not merely
made a mistake, but have made a very clear one - so clear that it is not open to rational
question." Id. at 144.
64. The canonical formulation is from Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)
("In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.").
65. Id. at 487.
66. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973).
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True Thayerian review involves statutes that the court believes to
be unconstitutional according to the judges' independent assessment
of the constitution, but which the court nonetheless refrains from
striking down. It is hard to discover opinions endorsing truly
Thayerian review. In recent years, the only such opinion of which I am
aware is Justice Souter's opinion concurring in the judgment in Nixon
v. United States.67 The case involved a challenge to the constitutionality
of the Senate's procedure for trying impeachments initially before a
committee and then on a paper review by the Senate as a whole.
Justice Souter did not find those procedures unconstitutional, but, he
wrote, he could "envision different and unusual circumstances that
might justify a more searching review of impeachment proceedings."68
These were circumstances in which "the Senate's action might be so
far beyond t he scope of its constitutional authority" that the courts
should step in.69 Justice Souter's formulation implies that the courts
might refrain from intervening when the Senate acted beyond its
constitutional authority, but not "so far beyond" that authority as to
warrant judicial intervention.70 This is indeed Thayerian review.71
Why do judges who understand the idea of deference in selected
areas nonetheless rarely act as true Thayerians? There are, I believe,
several reasons. First, note that Thayer presented his position as a
general one, applicable to all constitutional provisions across the
67. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
68. Id. at 253.
69. Id. at 254 (emphasis added).
70. Justice Souter's formulation resonates with my own understanding of Thayerian re
view. An alternative understanding treats Thayerian review as imposing an epistemic re
quirement on a judge's determination that a statute is unconstitutional. A judge finding a
statute unconstitutional must, on this understanding, conclude not simply that the statute is
unconstitutional (based on a full analysis of all the relevant considerations), but that this
conclusion is clear to a high degree of certainty ("beyond a reasonable doubt," for example).
Applying epistemic understandings of this sort to the operation of collective institutions like
courts and juries is notoriously difficult. The standard question is how an individual judge
can have the required degree of certainty when others (dissenting judges, a minority of ju
rors, the majority in the legislature) not only do not have that degree of certainty but actu
ally draw the contrary conclusion from their evaluation of the relevant material? The
Supreme Court's decisions on the permissibility of nonunanimous jury verdicts, and on the
requirement that juries be unanimous in finding aggravating circumstances in death penalty
cases, illustrate the difficulties. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) (upholding a capi
tal conviction based on instructions that did not require jurors to agree unanimously on the
defendant's state of mind); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (upholding state laws
allowing nonunanimous verdicts in criminal cases).
71. A cousin of Thayerian review can be found in the Supreme Court's doctrine dealing
with the circumstances under which a federal court can enjoin a pending prosecution under
an unconstitutional statute. The Court has limited those circumstances quite severely, but it
has at least held open the possibility that an injunction would be proper against a prosecu
tion for violating a statute that was " 'flagrantly and patently violative of express constitu
tional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and
against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.' " Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
53-54 (1971) (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)).
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board. Treating Thayerian review as part of an allocation strategy,
whereby some constitutional principles receive strong-form review
and others Thayerian review, requires the courts to distinguish among
constitutional provisions. As we have seen in connection with provi
sional review, drawing such distinctions in turn requires the courts to
place constitutional provisions on a continuum, some being more
important - in some sense - than others. Yet, all constitutional pro
visions have received the same degree of endorsement by the constitu
tion's makers, and the grounds for judicial distinctions among the pro
visions are quite unclear. The most sustained discussion of which
I am aware of distinctions among constitutional rights in Supreme
Court opinions is Justice White's assertion in

Bowers v. Hardwick,12

that the "Court . . . comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in
the language or design of the Constitutio11." Yet, this assertion seems
in serious tension with the Ninth Amendment.73 Similarly, the asser
tion in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,74 that First Amendment rights had a
"preferred position," never received an extended defense.
Second, as Justice Souter's formulation suggests, Thayerian review
requires the creation of another continuum. Ordinarily, we think of
constitutionality as a binary phenomenon: While it may sometimes be
hard to figure out whether a statute crosses the line from constitu
tional permissibility into constitutional violation, we are confident that
there is such a line. In Thayerian review, constitutionality is a matter
of degree: Unconstitutional, but not too unconstitutional; an error, but
not a clear error. The U.S. experience does not give me confidence
that judges can figure out ways to develop a continuumized notion of
constitutionality.75
Third, I suspect that true Thayerian review places judges in a diffi
cult psychological position. The state of mind needed for merely def
erential review is easy to achieve. All the judge needs to say is, "I
would not vote for this were I a legislator, because I believe it is
unwise policy, but - even as a legislator - I wouldn't think that the
proposal is unconstitutional." The state of mind of a Thayerian judge
is, I suspect, harder to achieve. The Thayerian judge must say, "In my
judgment this statute is unconstitutional, but - despite that, and

72. 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
74. 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
75. My guess, but it is only that, is that strong-form review conduces to making
continuumization difficult: A lot of the time the courts will be invoking the constitution
understood in binary terms (because such terms make it easier to explain to legislatures and
to the people why their choices cannot go into effect in the short run), thereby depriving the
courts of many opportunities to design the continuum of unconstitutionality.
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despite the fact that I have the power to block the statute's enforce
ment
I think that this statute should go into effect because it is not
-

too unconstitutional." Judges accustomed to acting on their judgments
of constitutionality may find it hard to refrain from doing so on some
occasions.76
A fourth reason for skepticism about the possibility of Thayerian
review as an allocation strategy for judges is related to the third. A
judge, given the choice between exercising strong-form review and
exercising Thayerian review, might wonder what could be accom
plished by doing the latter.77 I have suggested elsewhere that the
Thayerian judge might think of his or her choice as tutelary: The judge
might instruct legislators on their constitutional obligations by telling
them that the statute they have enacted is unconstitutional and that
they have to live with that unconstitutionality.78 The state of mind of
the Thayerian judge might be that of a wise parent, willing to let his or
her children make decisions that the parent believes to be unsound so
that the children will learn from experience how to make sound ones.79
The difficulty with the tutelary view is obvious. Why should legisla
tors who believe that the statute they enacted accomplishes valuable
public purposes care that judges think that the legislature's action
violates constitutional norms? Sometimes, perhaps, the legislators will
have overlooked the constitutional problems the Thayerian court
identifies. Having those difficulties pointed out, the legislature might
reassess the overall wisdom of the statute, deducting the constitutional
costs the court identified from the social benefits the legislature ini
tially identified and, perhaps, concluding that, net, the statute does not
actually advance the public well-being. And, sometimes, perhaps, an
aroused citizenry will become upset that their representatives have
been faithful to the constituents' immediate desires, or perhaps faith
ful only to the legislators' immediate self-interest,80 but unfaithful to

76. I have a similar suspicion about the epistemic version of Thayerian review. That ver
sion will sometimes require judges to say to themselves, "I am convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that this statute is unconstitutional even though four of my colleagues,
whose judgment is not always unreasonable, believe quite to the contrary, that the statute is
entirely constitutional."

77. It is clear enough what is accomplished by exercising strong-form review: An uncon
stitutional statute is not enforced.
78. Mark Tushnet, Thayer's Target: Judicial Review or Democracy?, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
9 (1993). There I argue that Thayer himself viewed Thayerian review as tutelary. I should

note that even at the time this article was published I was not convinced by my own argu
ment, although I thought then and still do that there were tutelary themes in Thayer's arti
cle. For present purposes, though, Thayer's own understanding is unimportant, as I am
concerned here with problems Thayerian review poses for judges.
79. I note that in my experience parents have difficulty in achieving this state of mind.
80. On the assumption that the legislators' actions might not correspond to the constitu

ents' immediate preferences because of agency problems.
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the constituents' longer-term commitments as expressed in the consti
tution.
More likely, though, neither legislators nor constituents will think
it necessary to respond to the Thayerian court's decision. The reason
is that statutes often express a considered judgment by the legislature
that the statutes are consistent with the constitution, and that such a
judgment is (often) reasonable even if the judges disagree.81 Here we
can return to Marbury itself. As is well-known, Marshall's opinion
uses a rhetorical trick to explain his justification of judicial review. He
asks readers to imagine a statute enacted by Congress that makes
testimony by one witness sufficient to convict for treason, blatantly
contradicting the constitutional requirement of two witnesses.82 In
such a case Congress could not reasonably have thought that its action
was consistent with the Constitution. But, consider the statute at issue
in Marbury itself, which the Court held unconstitutional because it
altered the allocation of jurisdiction prescribed in the Constitution. It
is a standard point in the Marbury literature to note that the
Constitution could reasonably be interpreted to allow Congress to
shift cases from the constitutionally identified category of appellate
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.83 Most real
world cases are more likely to resemble Marbury than to resemble the
hypothetical treason statute. And, in such cases, judges exercising
Thayerian tutelary review will confront a legislature whose members
can reasonably say to themselves, "We understand that the court's
interpretation of the constitution is reasonable, and different from
ours, but we also understand that our interpretation is a reasonable
one too. Given the choice between two reasonable interpretations, we
will adhere to our initial judgment." In short, a Thayerian court may
hope to teach the legislature a lesson about the legislature's constitu
tional obligations, but the students are likely to think the lesson
unnecessary.
These problems with true Thayerian review suggest that courts will
have difficulty pursuing a defensible strategy in which they allocate
some issues to strong-form review and others to Thayerian review.
IV. CONCLUSION
In asserting that judicial review was necessary to ensure that "the
legislature may [not] alter the constitution by an ordinary act,"84 Chief

81. For a more extended discussion, see Mark Tushnet, Non-Judicial Review, 40 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 453 (2003).
82. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803).
83. See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE
L.J. 1, 31-32.
84. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
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Justice Marshall may be taken to assert as well that constitutionalism
requires strong-form judicial review. Weak-form review suggests that
there is a category lying between ordinary legislation and extraordi
nary constitutional amendment.85 With the possibility of weak-form
review on the table, it becomes possible to consider as well strategies
that would allocate some issues to strong-form review, others to
weak-form review.
Here I have explored some aspects of allocation strategies operat
ing one level removed from that of constitutional design. I have sug
gested that allocation strategies may be unstable: A legislative alloca
tion that appears to give courts the power to engage in strong-form
review may be revoked, and judicial allocations that appear to commit
the courts to weak-form review may, in practical political terms,
amount to strong-form review in disguise. More generally, allocation
strategies may be designed, consciously or otherwise, to conceal the
reality of judicial review - in the one case, to pretend that courts
really do have the power to resolve contentious issues permanently, in
the other to pretend that the courts are permitting the people to be
truly self-governing in the areas subject to weak-form review.
Weak-form judicial review, and the possibilities of allocation strategies
it creates, are intriguing novelties in constitutional design. It remains
to be seen, though, how permanent, enduring, and distinctive their
contribution to constitutional design is.

85. Of course, constitutionalist systems lacking judicial review - such as Great
Britain's, at least before the adoption of the Human Rights Act 1998
show that Marshall's
claim that constitutionalism requires judicial review is false. What he missed about such sy�
tems was the possibility that embedded political norms would place impediments in the way
of changing the constitution at least as severe as those created by cumbersome, formal
amendment procedures.
-

